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The mission in Kunduz, from GroenLinks’ point of view

In 2010, the Labor Party ‘won’ the battle for the Afghan mission: it was cancelled. That battle has flared up again in recent months. The outcome of this battle for Kunduz seemed to depend mainly on GroenLinks, which ultimately agreed to the civilian police training mission. Although the mission is a lot more peaceful this time, many wonder whether the faction did the right thing. Was this decision wise from GroenLinks’ point of view?

The supporters

Perhaps the most important consideration was the supporters: what do they think and how would this choice influence the upcoming Provincial Elections? According to Joop van Holsteyn, associate professor and special professor of Voter Research at the University of Leiden, the members are divided, but mainly cautious on military matters. But three in ten members of the party have no problem with the mission, especially newer members abhor military missions. This is evident from the 2008 Leiden Party Member Survey. This reluctance is even more evident from the four hundred members that GroenLinks lost after the decision. But is this very strange for a party that once emerged from, among others, the Pacifist Socialist Party? However, there were three hundred new memberships.

The election manifesto

Although the supporters did not always agree with the decision, it was in the spirit of the election manifesto, according to Jolande Sap, the new party leader of GroenLinks. The internationally oriented party says it has always felt great commitment to Afghanistan. Indeed, GroenLinks submitted a motion in April 2010 that urged the cabinet to investigate whether the Netherlands could design a civilian police training mission that would contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Although the party had to make a deal for this mission with a bad cabinet, according to Jolande Sap, it did so: GroenLinks is not an opposing party. If we had said no to the police training mission in Kunduz, the cabinet would not have been sent home, but there would also have been no mission. It is a party with ideals, ideals that appear not to be limited to the Netherlands.

Ideals

But does this mission actually help fulfill those ideals? Does she help make Afghanistan a better country? GroenLinks site states that civilian police tasks have been neglected in Afghanistan, because military efforts absorbed all attention, money and manpower. And while public order enforcement starts with well-trained civilian police officers. GroenLinks has therefore also agreed to a civilian mission and claims that it has been assured that the Netherlands will no longer participate in the fight against terror. But don’t we ensure that the men we train will ultimately fight against or even for the Taliban? GroenLinks responds that if recruits or trained agents are nevertheless deployed in an offensive operation, measures will be taken. The Netherlands also gets the final say in the selection of the recruits. After training they will be monitored by a tracking system and return days will be arranged.

Location

A final point of discussion is the location: there is no agreement whether Kunduz was the best choice. The province is not one of the most unsafe provinces in Afghanistan, which are mainly found in the South. This can be seen as an advantage, but what is the point of the mission? Western diplomats who wish to remain anonymous state that Dutch police are not needed in Kunduz. They could be better deployed in neighboring provinces such as Takhar, Badakhshan and Baghlan, where the need for them is greater. There are already sufficient trainers in Kunduz. The police commander of neighboring Takhar also agrees. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense responded that the Netherlands can only start a police training mission in Kunduz province. A training mission in one of the other provinces mentioned would require support from many more soldiers. The training centers in Kunduz would also have a regional function, because officers are also trained for the provinces of Takhar and Baghlan, which do not have their own centers. Both provinces have fewer military support and protection options.